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Abstract—The problem of limiting the diffusion of information
in social networks has received substantial attention. To deal
with the problem, existing works aim to prevent the diffusion
of information to as many nodes as possible, by deleting a
given number of edges. Thus, they assume that the diffusing
information can affect all nodes and that the deletion of each edge
has the same impact on the information propagation properties
of the graph. In this work, we propose an approach which
lifts these limiting assumptions. Our approach allows specifying
the nodes to which information diffusion should be prevented
and their maximum allowable activation probability, and it
performs edge deletion while avoiding drastic changes to the
ability of the network to propagate information. To realize our
approach, we propose a measure that captures changes, caused
by deletion, to the PageRank distribution of the graph. Based
on the measure, we define the problem of finding an edge
subset to delete as an optimization problem. We show that
the problem can be modeled as a Submodular Set Cover (SSC)
problem and design an approximation algorithm, based on the
well-known approximation algorithm for SSC. In addition, we
develop an iterative heuristic that has similar effectiveness but is
significantly more efficient than our algorithm. Experiments on
real and synthetic data show the effectiveness and efficiency of
our methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Controlling the diffusion (propagation) of information in
social networks is an important task in multiple domains, such
as viral marketing and computer security. In the most common
setting, the diffusion starts from a small subset of users who
aim to activate their friends. The activated friends of these
users attempt to activate their own friends, and the diffusion
process proceeds similarly until no new users are activated.
The diffusing information comes in different forms, such as
a link to the website of a new product or to a malicious
website to download malware. Typically, the social network
is represented as a graph, the initial users correspond to a
subset of nodes called seeds, and the activation probabilities
of nodes are computed according to a diffusion model [13].
Recently, many works [14], [15], [18], [20] focused on
limiting the diffusion of potentially harmful information, by
strategically modifying the graph, before the start of the
diffusion process. These works aim to find a subset of k edges,
whose deletion by a decision maker (operator) reduces the
expected number of activated nodes at the end of the process
(spread) as much as possible. However, they consider a rather
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limited setting, since they assume that: (I) the diffusing infor-
mation can affect all nodes (i.e., adopt a collective approach),
and (II) the deletion of each edge has the same impact on
the information propagation properties of the graph (i.e., the
number of deleted edges determines the ability of the network
to propagate information after deletion).
In this work, we consider the problem of limiting infor-
mation diffusion through edge deletion, in a new setting.
Specifically, we propose a selective approach that allows spec-
ifying the nodes to which information should not be diffused
(vulnerable nodes) and their maximum allowable activation
probability. This flexibility is important in marketing when
there are certain classes of users, based on demographics, loca-
tion, or health condition, that may be harmed by the diffusing
information about a product [11], or form and spread negative
opinions about it [6]. In addition, our approach determines
the impact of deleting an edge subset on the information
propagation properties of the graph, using PageRank [2],
[4], a fundamental model of information propagation based
on network topology [1], [22]. This is important because
typically there is much other information (i.e., external to the
information that is limited), which needs to be propagated on
the network after edge deletion. For example, a node with
large PageRank score contributes significantly to information
propagation. Thus, deleting all its incoming edges, which
prevents the propagation of information through the node,
should be penalized more heavily than deleting the same total
number of edges from many nodes with smaller PageRank.
Our approach reduces the activation probability Pv of each
vulnerable node v to at most a threshold maxP , while pre-
serving the PageRank distribution of the graph. The activation
probabilities are computed by the Linear Threshold (LT) [13]
model, a well-established model of the diffusion of potentially
harmful information [14], [15]. The threshold maxP is a
simple, application-dependent measure of significance (alike
the minimum support threshold in pattern mining), which
models the maximum allowable activation probability for each
vulnerable node. The selection of maxP and of vulnerable
nodes is performed by the operator, based on domain knowl-
edge (e.g., customer vulnerability analysis and policies [19]).
Since the PageRank score of a node u can be interpreted as
the probability that a random walk which starts from a random
node ends at u [1], our approach avoids drastic changes to the
ability of nodes to propagate any information. Note that this is
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edge PRH gPv1 gPv2 gPv1,v2
e1 0.062 0.738 0.729 1.447
e2 0.062 0 0 0
e3 0.043 0.729 0.729 1.447
e4 0.036 0 0.729 0.719
e5 0.036 0.729 0 0.728
e6 0.043 0.009 0 0.009
e7 0.072 0.009 0 0.009
(c)
Algorithm Del. edges PRH
AGDE e3 0.043
IGDE {e4, e5} 0.071
[14] k = 2 {e1, e2} 0.124
(d)
Fig. 1: (a) Graph and edge probabilities; s is a seed, and v1, v2 are vulnerable nodes. The method of [14] with k = 1 (resp., k = 2) deletes
e2, (resp., {e1, e2}). (b) The PageRank distribution of the graph in Fig. 1(a) before and after deleting e1, {e1, e2}, and e3. (c) PRH , path
probability gain gPv1 and gPv2 used in IGDE, and aggregate path probability gain gPv1,v2 used in AGDE. (d) The deleted edges and
PRH for AGDE, IGDE, and the method of [14] with k = 2, when applied to Example 1.
not possible if the LT model, or any other model which only
represents a single diffusion process from given seeds, is used
instead of PageRank. This is because the use of such a model
would allow deleting edges that do not substantially reduce
the spread of the diffusion process but harm the ability of the
network to propagate other information.
Enforcing our approach is challenging, because: (I) There
is an exponential number of edge subsets that can be deleted.
(II) There are dependencies between edges, which affect the
activation probability of nodes. Specifically, the deletion of
an edge (ul, u) reduces the activation probability of all non-
seed nodes reachable from u, because these nodes can no
longer be activated by a path that contains (ul, u). (III)
Existing measures [2] that quantify changes to the PageRank
distribution cannot be used as optimization criteria in efficient
approximation algorithms. In addition, our approach cannot be
enforced by existing methods [14], [15] that limit the diffusion
of information under the LT model. This is because these
methods may not limit the activation probabilities of vulner-
able nodes, or they may substantially affect the information
propagation on the network, as shown in Example 1.
Example 1. Consider the graph of Fig. 1(a), where the seed
is s, and the vulnerable nodes are v1 and v2. The activation
probabilities Pv1 and Pv2 in the LT model are equal to 0.738
and 0.729, respectively. Assume that the activation probabili-
ties Pv1 and Pv2 need to be limited to at most 0.01. Applying
the method of [14] with k = 1, deletes e2 = (s, u1). This
minimizes the expected number of activated nodes. However,
Pv1 and Pv2 do not change, since all simple paths from s
to v1 and to v2 are preserved [10]. Using k = 2, results in
deleting {e1, e2}. This reduces Pv1 and Pv2 , to zero. However,
the information propagation on the network is significantly
affected, since no information can be propagated from u1, u2,
or u3 to the nodes on the right of s.
Our work makes the following contributions:
First, we propose a measure that captures changes, caused
by edge deletion, to the PageRank distribution. Our measure,
called PageRank-Harm (PRH), penalizes the deletion of an
edge based on the ratio between the PageRank score and out-
degree of the start node of the edge. For example, e1 = (s, u6)
has a larger PRH than e3 = (u6, u7) in Fig. 1(a), because
s has a larger PageRank score than u6 (see Fig. 1(b)) and s
and u6 have the same out-degree. Since the PageRank score of
each node is distributed equally into its out-neighbors, deleting
an edge with large PRH incurs a substantial change to the
PageRank scores of many other nodes. For instance, deleting
e1 instead of e3 causes a larger change to the PageRank scores
of the nodes in Fig. 1(a), as shown in Fig. 1(b). In addition, we
show that the PRH measure can be incorporated into efficient
approximation algorithms.
Second, we formally define the optimization problem of
PageRank-preserving Edge Deletion (PED). The problem re-
quires finding an edge subset whose deletion: (I) minimizes
changes to the PageRank distribution of the graph according
to PRH , and (II) limits the activation probability of each
vulnerable node to at most maxP . We also prove that PED
is NP-hard.
Third, we show that PED, for a single vulnerable node, can
be modeled as a Submodular Set Cover (SSC) [9], [21] prob-
lem. This allows developing an approximation algorithm based
on the well-known approximation algorithm for SSC [21]. Our
algorithm, called GDE, finds an edge subset iteratively. In each
iteration, it selects the edge with the minimum ratio between
PRH and path probability gain, which quantifies the benefit
of selecting the edge in terms of decreasing the activation
probability Pv of the vulnerable node. When the deletion of
the selected edges can limit Pv to at most maxP , these edges
are deleted and the algorithm stops. GDE finds an edge subset
whose PRH is larger than that of the optimal solution by at
most a logarithmic factor, which depends on the PRH and
the path probability gain of the subset.
Fourth, we propose two algorithms for PED, when there
are multiple vulnerable nodes. The first is an approximation
algorithm, called AGDE. The algorithm is similar to GDE,
but it selects an edge with small PRH which substantially
reduces the activation probabilities of multiple vulnerable
nodes simultaneously. Specifically, in each iteration, AGDE
selects the edge with the minimum ratio between PRH and
benefit in terms of decreasing the activation probability of
vulnerable nodes whose activation probability exceeds maxP .
The benefit is referred to as aggregate path probability gain.
AGDE achieves a logarithmic approximation ratio, which
depends on the PRH and the aggregate path probability gain
of the selected edges. Our experiments show that AGDE finds
near-optimal solutions (see Fig. 5a). The second algorithm,
IGDE, iterates over the vulnerable nodes, in decreasing order
of their activation probability, and applies GDE to approxi-
mate the PED problem for one vulnerable node per iteration.
IGDE is up to two orders of magnitude more efficient than
AGDE, because the deleted edges in an iteration are not
considered again, and it produces solutions of similar quality,
as shown in our experiments. To illustrate AGDE and IGDE,
we provide Example 2.
Example 2. AGDE and IGDE were applied to Example 1,
using maxP = 0.01. AGDE selected the edge e3 in Fig. 1(a),
which has the minimum ratio between PRH and aggregate
path probability gain gPv1,v2 (see Fig. 1(c)). The deletion of
e3 limits Pv1 and Pv2 to at most 0.01, thus AGDE deleted
e3. IGDE considered v1 first, since Pv1 is larger than Pv2 ,
and selected e5. This is because e5 has the minimum ratio
between PRH and path probability gain gPv1 among the
edges {e1, e3, e5, e6, e7}, whose deletion decreases Pv1 (see
Fig. 1(c)). The deletion of e5 limits Pv1 to at most 0.01, thus
IGDE deleted e5. Then, IGDE considered v2 and deleted e4.
The deletion of {e4, e5} limits both Pv1 and Pv2 to at most
0.01. As shown in Fig. 1(d), the solutions of IGDE and the
method of [14] with k = 2 have 65% and 186% larger PRH
than that of the solution of AGDE, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Preliminaries
Let G(V,E) be a directed graph. V is a set of nodes of size
|V |, and E is a set of edges of size |E|. The set of in-neighbors
of a node u is denoted with n−(u) and has size |n−(u)|, which
is referred to as the in-degree of u. The set of out-neighbors
of u is denoted with n+(u) and has size |n+(u)|, which is
referred to as the out-degree of u.
A path q = [(u1, u2), . . . , (um−1, u)] is an ordered set of
edges, which has length |q| = m− 1. A path q in which each
node, u1, . . . , u, is unique (i.e., a path with no cycle) is a
simple path. A path that starts and ends at the same node is a
cycle path. We assume simple paths, unless stated otherwise.
To quantify the distance between two probability distri-
butions, R = {r1, . . . , rm} and R′ = {r′1, . . . , r′m}, the
KL-divergence and the L1 distance can be used. The L1
distance quantifies the absolute error between R and R′ as
L1(R,R
′) =
∑
i∈[1,m] |R(ri)−R
′(r′i)|, and it is typically used
to measure distance between PageRank distributions [2]. The
L1 distance also forms the basis of: (I) the Gower distance,
which is defined as Gower(R,R′) = 1m · L1(R,R
′), and
(II) the Average Relative Error (ARE), which is defined as
ARE(R,R′) = 1m ·
∑
i∈[1,m]
|R(ri)−R
′(r′i)|
R(ri)
.
Let U be a universe of elements and 2U its power set. A
set function f : 2U → R is non-decreasing, if f(X) ≤ f(Y )
for all subsets X ⊆ Y ⊆ U , monotone, if f(X) ≤ f(X ∪ u)
for each u /∈ X , and submodular, if it satisfies the diminishing
returns property f(X ∪ {u})− f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {u})− f(Y ),
for all X ⊆ Y ⊆ U and any u ∈ U \ Y [16].
B. PageRank
PageRank [4] is a well-established model of information
propagation based on network topology [1], [22]. The PageR-
ank score of a node u of a graph G is:
PR(u,G) = α
|V |
+ (1− α) ·
∑
ul∈n
−(u)
PR(ul,G)
|n+(ul)|
(1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the restart probability, which is usually
set to 0.15 [2]. Eq. 1 assumes that each node has out-degree at
least 1 (i.e., there are no dangling nodes). If there are dangling
nodes, we treat them as in [17]. For simplicity of presentation,
we henceforth assume that G does not contain dangling nodes.
We will write PR(u) for PR(u,G), when G is clear from the
context. The PageRank distribution of the graph G is denoted
with PR(G), and it is defined as the vector of the PageRank
scores of all nodes of G [2].
C. The Linear Threshold (LT) model
The edge probability of an edge (ul, u) is denoted with
p((ul, u)) and reflects how likely u is activated by ul. For
each node u, it holds that
∑
ul∈n−(u)
p((ul, u)) ≤ 1. The path
probability of a path q = [(u1, u2), . . . , (um−1, u)] is defined
as P (q) =
∏
e∈q p(e) and reflects how likely u is activated by
u1 through q.
Let S ⊆ V be the set of seeds. Let also Qs,u be the
set of paths from a seed s to a non-seed node u of G that
do not pass through another seed, and QS,u = ∪s∈SQs,u.
The activation probability of u by QS,u is computed as
P(u,QS,u) =
∑
q∈QS,u
P (q), where P (q) is the path proba-
bility of a path q in QS,u [10]. We denote P(u,QS,u) with
Pu, when QS,u is clear from the context. We also define
the activation graph G˜u of u as the subgraph of G which
is induced by the edges of all paths in QS,u.
The exact computation of Pu is a #P -hard problem for
general graphs [7]. However, the path probability of each path
decreases exponentially with the path length. Thus, Pu can
be estimated accurately and efficiently, based on the subset
of paths in QS,u whose seeds are “close” to u [10]. To find
these paths, we adapt the depth-first-search-based algorithm
of [10]. For each seed, the algorithm iteratively extends each
path from the seed and prunes it, if its path probability is lower
than a threshold h. Then, Pu is computed based on the paths
from seeds to u that are found by the algorithm, and G˜u is
constructed as the graph induced by the edges of these paths.
The threshold h ∈ [0, 1] represents the maximum tolerable
estimation error and is operator-specified [10]. The impact of
h on our approach is studied in Section VIII.
III. THE PRH MEASURE
The deletion of an edge affects the PageRank score of
the end node of the deleted edge, according to Eq. 1. In
addition, the PageRank score of this node is distributed into
its out-neighbors. Thus, the PageRank scores of these nodes
change, and the change is propagated similarly. Therefore,
edge deletion may incur a substantial change to the PageRank
distribution. Minimizing the change in our problem is chal-
lenging, because: (I) there are O(2|E|) edge subsets that can
be deleted, and (II) existing measures that capture changes to
the PageRank distribution (see Section II-A) are not monotone
and cannot be incorporated into efficient approximation algo-
rithms. Therefore, we propose PRH , a monotone measure that
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Fig. 2: Cases that summarize the relation between δ(u∗) and PRH(e). The deleted edge e is in bold, UL is the set of in-neighbors of u∗,
and nodes and edges that are not shown are denoted with “. . .”.
can be used by a greedy approach to produce approximately
optimal solutions. In the following, we outline the greedy
approach and present the PRH measure.
The greedy approach constructs the subset of edges E′ ⊆ E
to be deleted iteratively. In each iteration, the approach adds
into E′ the edge e that minimizes the ratio of: (I) the distance
between PR(G′1) and PR(G′2), where G′1 (respectively, G′2)
is produced from the graph G by deleting E′ (respectively,
E′∪e), and (II) aggregate path probability gain. The measure
of the distance must be monotone (i.e., its value for the deletion
of E′ must not be larger than that for the deletion of E′ ∪ e).
Otherwise, the greedy approach does not offer approximation
guarantees, as we will explain later. However, the measures
that capture changes to the PageRank distribution are not
monotone, as shown in Example 3.
Example 3. The subgraphs G′1 and G′2 of the graph G in
Fig. 1(a) are produced by deleting E′ = {e1} and E′ ∪
e2 = {e1, e2}, respectively. The distance between PR(G) and
PR(G′1) is higher than that between PR(G) and PR(G′2),
according to each of the measures in Fig. 3.
Subgraph Deleted edges L1 Gower ARE KL-divergence
G′1 E
′ = {e1} 0.347 0.032 0.341 0.126
G′2 E
′ ∪ e2 = {e1, e2} 0.188 0.017 0.178 0.051
Fig. 3: Existing measures favor the deletion of the edges {e1, e2}
instead of {e1} from G in Fig. 1(a).
On the contrary, PRH is a monotone measure. In Section
III-A, we define the PRH of an edge e = (u, u′) and show
that it is an effective proxy of the changes to the PageRank
scores of nodes caused by deleting e.
In Section III-B, we define the PRH of a subset of edges,
based on the observation that the dependencies among the
PRH of these edges are weak. That is, the deletion of an edge
e = (u, u′) does not substantially affect the PRH of another
edge e′ = (u˜1, u˜2) in the subset. Specifically, we show that the
change to the PageRank score of u˜1 decreases exponentially
with the length of the path from u to u˜1.
A. The PRH of a single edge
The PRH of an edge e = (u, u′) is defined as PRH(e) =
(1−α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)| , where PR(u,G) is the PageRank score of
u in G, |n+(u)| is the out-degree of u, and α is the restart
probability of Eq. 1.
Let δ(u∗) = PR(u∗, G)−PR(u∗, G′) be the change to the
PageRank score of a node u∗, when the deletion of the edge
e = (u, u′) from G produces G′. We show that PRH(e) can
be used as a proxy of δ(u∗). Specifically, there are two cases
when the edge e is deleted, which are illustrated in Fig. 2:
I u∗ is an out-neighbor of u, and
(a) u∗ = u′, or (b) u∗ 6= u′.
II u∗ is not an out-neighbor of u.
We now consider these cases in detail.
Case I Consider the case I(a). Before the deletion of e, the
contribution of e to PR(u∗) was (1−α)· PR(u,G)|n+(u)| = PRH(e),
according to Eq. 1. However, after deleting e, u is no longer
an in-neighbor of u∗. Thus, the contribution of e to PR(u∗)
is zero. Now consider the case I(b). The deletion of e reduces
the out-degree of the node u by one. Thus, the contribution
of (u, u∗) to PR(u∗) changes from (1−α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)| to (1−
α) · PR(u,G
′)
|n+(u)|−1 . However, in either case, u
∗ may have a set of
in-neighbors other than u, which is denoted with UL (see Figs.
2I(a) and 2I(b)). Therefore, δ(u∗) is computed as in Eq. 2:
δ(u∗) =


PRH(e) + (1− α) ·
∑
ul∈UL
δ(ul)
|n+(ul)|
, u∗ = u′
PRH(e) − (1− α) · PR(u,G
′)
|n+(u)|−1
+ (1− α) ·
∑
ul∈UL
δ(ul)
|n+(ul)|
, u∗ 6= u′
(2)
where δ(ul) is the change to the PageRank score of a node ul
in UL, and α is the restart probability of Eq. 1. The proof of
Eq. 2 follows easily from Eq. 1 and the definition of PRH ,
and it is omitted.
Case II The deletion of e changes the PageRank scores of the
out-neighbors of u, according to Case I (see Figs. 2II(a) and
II(b)), and the change is propagated to other nodes similarly.
In particular, δ(u∗) is computed using Eq. 3:
δ(u∗) = (1− α) ·
∑
ul∈n
−(u∗)
δ(ul)
|n+(ul)|
(3)
which follows from Eq. 2, when u is not an in-neighbor of u∗.
Eq. 3 is computed backwards recursively to the out-neighbors
of u.
Thus, in Cases I and II, δ(u∗) is determined by PRH(e)
and/or by the change to PR(u∗), caused by the incom-
ing edges to u∗. Furthermore, the change incurred by an
edge (ul, u∗) decreases exponentially with the length of the
path from u to ul. Specifically, given a simple path q =
[(u, u′), (u′, u′2) . . . , (u
′
|q|−1, ul)] (see Fig. 2II(a)), we obtain
Eq. 4:
δ(ul) = (1− α)
|q|−1 · δ(u
′)
|n+(u′)|·
∏|q|−1
r=2
|n+(u′r)|
(4)
by recursively applying Eq. 3 for δ(ul) over u′|q|−1, . . . , u′2.
The case of a path q containing a cycle is similar (omitted).
Therefore, δ(ul) diminishes as we move away from u, and
δ(u∗) heavily depends on PRH(e) in most cases. Conse-
quently, PRH is a proxy of the change, caused by edge
deletion, to the PageRank scores of nodes.
B. The PRH of a subset of edges
We define the PRH of an edge subset E′ ⊆ E as
PRH(E′) =
∑
e∈E′ PRH(e), where e is an edge in E′ that
starts from a node u of G and PRH(e) = (1− α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)| .
Clearly, PRH is monotone since PRH(E′) ≤ PRH(E′∪e′),
for each edge e′ /∈ E′.
The PRH of each edge in E′ is computed based on the
graph G. This strategy allows our approach to select an edge
efficiently, without computing the PageRank distribution of
the graph that is produced by the deletion of the currently
selected edges. Furthermore, the strategy is effective, because
the deletion of a currently selected edge e = (u, u′) does not
substantially affect the PRH of another edge e′ = (u˜1, u˜2).
This is because δ(u˜1) decreases exponentially with the
length of the path from u to u˜1, since δ(u˜1) is computed
by applying Eq. 4 for ul = u˜1. Thus, δ(u˜1) is a small fraction
of δ(u∗), which is already small, since δ(u∗) depends on
PRH(e) and our approach selects edges with small PRH .
In Section VIII, we show that our PRH computation strategy
is much more efficient and equally effective as the alterna-
tive strategy, which computes PRH(e) on the graph that is
produced from G by deleting the currently selected edges.
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The PED problem is defined as follows.
Problem 1 (PageRank-preserving Edge Deletion (PED)).
Given a graph G(V,E), a threshold maxP in [0, 1], a set
of seed nodes S and a set of vulnerable nodes D, such that
S,D ⊆ V and S ∩ D = ∅, and the PRH of each edge
e ∈ E, find an edge subset E′ ⊆ E, so that: (I) PRH(E′)
is minimum, and (II) the activation probability Pv ≤ maxP ,
for each node v ∈ D, after the deletion of E′ from G.
The problem requires finding an edge subset E′ with min-
imum PRH , whose deletion limits the activation probability
Pv of each vulnerable node v to at most maxP . We assume
that the operator selects the seeds (e.g., using existing methods
[10], [13]), as well as the threshold maxP and the vulnerable
nodes, based on domain knowledge (e.g., customer vulner-
ability analysis and policies [19]). In addition, the operator
computes the PRH of each edge. The PED problem is NP-
hard, as shown in Theorem 1. Variations of the PED problem
that use a fixed maxP = 0, or multiple thresholds, are easily
dealt with by our algorithms.
Theorem 1. PED is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is by reducing the NP-hard Weighted Set
Cover (WSC) problem [8] to PED. The WSC problem is
defined as follows. Given a collection L = {L1, . . . , Lm} of
sets, such that each Lj ∈ L has a nonnegative weight w(Lj)
and ∪Lj∈LLj = U = {u1, . . . , un}, find a subcollection
L′ ⊆ L that (I) covers all elements of U (i.e., ∪Lj∈L′Lj = U ),
and (II) has minimum ∑Lj∈L′ w(Lj).
We map a given instance IWSC of WSC to an instance
IPED of PED, in polynomial time, as follows (see Fig. 4):
(I) Each subset Lj ∈ L is mapped to [sj , xj , (sj , xj)], where sj
is a seed, xj is a non-seed node, and (sj , xj) is an edge.
(II) Each element ui in each Lj ∈ L is mapped to [xj , ui, (xj, ui)],
where ui is a vulnerable node and (xj, ui) is an edge.
(III) We assign PRH to edges as follows: PRH((sj, xj)) = w(Lj)
and PRH((xj, ui)) = ∞, to force the algorithm for PED
to select (sj , xj), which corresponds to Lj , and prevent the
selection of (xj , ui).
(IV) We assign edge probabilities as follows: p((sj, xj)) = 1 and
p((xj, ui)) =
1
|n−(ui)|
, to ensure that the path probability
of [(sj , xj), (xj , ui)] is determined by |n−(ui)|, which cor-
responds to the frequency of the element ui over the subsets of
L (number of subsets containing ui).
(V) We set maxP = 1 − 1
maxui |n
−(ui)|
, so that at least one
path [(sj , xj), (xj , ui)] to each ui is disconnected after the
deletion of the selected edges by the algorithm for PED. This
corresponds to covering each element ui ∈ U by at least one
subset Lj .
Fig. 4: The graph created from an instance of the WSC problem. The
seeds are s1, . . . , sm and the vulnerable nodes are u1, . . . , un. The
edge probability (resp. PRH) appears above (resp. below) the edges.
In the following, we prove the correspondence between a
solution L′ to the given instance IWSC and a solution E′ to
the instance IPED .
We first prove that, if L′ is a solution to IWSC , then E′
is a solution to IPED . Since ∪Lj∈L′Lj = U = {u1, . . . , un},
the deletion of E′ disconnects at least one path to each ui,
i ∈ [1, n], and Pui ≤ maxP holds, for each ui. Since∑
Lj∈L′
w(Lj) is minimum, PRH(E′) =
∑
Lj∈L′
w(Lj) is
minimum. Thus, E′ is a solution to IPED .
We now prove that, if an edge subset E′ is a solution
to IPED , then L′ is a solution to IWSC . Since E′ is a
solution to IPED , at least one path to each ui is discon-
nected, and Pui ≤ maxP holds for each ui, i ∈ [1, n].
Thus, L′ satisfies ∪Lj∈L′Lj = {u1, . . . , un} = U . Since
PRH(E′) =
∑
Lj∈L′
w(Lj) is minimum, L′ has minimum∑
Lj∈L′
w(Lj). Thus, L′ is a solution to IWSC .
V. ADDRESSING PED FOR A SINGLE VULNERABLE NODE
This section details our methodology for addressing PED,
when there is a single vulnerable node v. The main idea is
to model PED as a Submodular Set Cover (SSC) [9], [21]
problem and to develop an algorithm for PED based on the
approximation algorithm for SSC [21]. Our algorithm is called
GDE and is applied to the activation graph G˜v of v. The use
of G˜v improves efficiency, since only edges that affect the
activation probability of v are considered (see Section II-C).
Modeling PED as SSC. We show that PED, for a single
vulnerable node, can be modeled as an SSC problem, by means
of a reduction. We first provide the definition of the SSC
problem [9] and then a formulation of PED based on SSC,
which is referred to as PEDSSC and is used in the reduction.
After that, we present the reduction from PEDSSC to SSC.
Definition 1 (Submodular Set Cover (SSC) [9]). Let U be a
universe of elements and c(u) be the nonnegative cost of an
element u of U . Let also C be a function defined as C(S) =∑
u∈S c(u), for a subset S of U , and F be a monotone non-
decreasing submodular function. Given a nonnegative constant
b, find a subset S ⊆ U whose cost C(S) is minimum and
F (S) ≥ b.
The PEDSSC problem is defined as follows.
Problem 2 (PEDSSC). Given a threshold maxP in [0, 1],
a set of seed nodes S, a vulnerable node v, the activation
graph G˜v, and the PRH of each edge of G˜v , find an
edge subset E′ ⊆ E of G˜v , such that: (I) PRH(E′) is
minimum, and (II) P(v,QS,v, E)−P(v,QS,v, E′) ≤ maxP ,
where P(v,QS,v, E) (resp., P(v,QS,v, E′)) is the activation
probability of v by the paths of QS,v that contain edges in E
(resp., in E′).
In order to perform the reduction, we show that
P(v,QS,v, E
′) is monotone non-decreasing submodular, in
Theorem 2. Intuitively, the submodularity property holds,
because the addition of an edge e into E′ increases
P(v,QS,v, E
′) by the sum of the path probabilities of paths
that contain e and no other edge in E′. Thus, the increase
caused by adding e into E′ is at least equal to the increase to
P(v,QS,v, E
′′) caused by adding e into a superset E′′ of E′.
Theorem 2. The function P(v,QS,v, E′) is monotone non-
decreasing submodular.
Proof: Let Ev be the edge set of G˜v , E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ Ev be
subsets of Ev, and e be an edge in Ev \E2. Let also QE1S,v ⊆
QS,v and QE2S,v ⊆ QS,v be the set of paths containing edges
in E1 and E2, respectively, and QeS,v ⊆ QS,v be the set of
paths containing e. We will show that Eq. 5 holds in each of
the following cases.
P(v, QS,v, E1 ∪ e)−P(v,QS,v, E1) ≥
P(v, QS,v, E2 ∪ e)− P(v, QS,v, E2)
(5)
Case I: All paths in QeS,v are contained in Q
E1
S,v. Thus,
P(v,QS,v, E1 ∪ e) − P(v,QS,v, E1) = 0 ≥ P(v,QS,v, E2 ∪
e)−P(v,QS,v, E2) = 0, since adding e does not change QE1S,v
and QE2S,v.
Case II: All paths in QeS,v are contained in Q
E2
S,v and at least
one path is not contained in QE1S,v. Thus, P(v,QS,v, E1 ∪ e)−
P(v,QS,v, E1) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E2 ∪ e) − P(v,QS,v, E2) = 0,
since adding e adds paths into QE1S,v only.
Case III: At least one path in QeS,v is not contained in Q
E2
S,v.
Thus, P(v,QS,v, E1∪ e)−P(v,QS,v, E1) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E2∪
e)−P(v,QS,v, E2), since adding e adds into QE1S,v all the paths
that are added into QE2S,v and the paths of QeS,v contained in
QE2S,v \Q
E1
S,v.
Consequently, Eq. 5 holds in each case and P(v,QS,v, E′)
is submodular. In addition, P(v,QS,v, E′) is monotone, since
P(v,QS,v, E
′) ≤ P(v,QS,v, E
′ ∪ e) for each e /∈ E′, and
non-decreasing, since P(v,QS,v, E1) ≤ P(v,QS,v, E2).
We now present the reduction from PEDSSC to SSC.
Theorem 3. PEDSSC can be reduced to SSC.
Proof. (Sketch) For any instance IPEDSSC of PEDSSC, an
instance ISSC of SSC can be constructed as follows: (I) for
each edge e with PRH(e) in the activation graph G˜v , add
into the universe U an element u with cost c(u) = PRH(e),
(II) define the function F (S) = P(v,QS,v, E′), where E′
is the edge subset corresponding to S ⊆ U , and (III) set
b = P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP . In addition, for any feasible
solution S of ISSC , a feasible solution E′ of IPEDSSC with
PRH(E′) = C(S) can be constructed, by adding into E′
the edges that correspond to the elements of S. Note that
E′ is a solution of IPEDSSC because F (S) ≥ b implies
P(v,QS,v, E
′) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP , which implies
P(v,QS,v, E)− P(v,QS,v, E
′) ≤ maxP .
Since PEDSSC can be modeled as an SSC problem, we can
obtain an approximate solution to PEDSSC using the algorithm
of [21]. This algorithm iteratively adds the element u ∈ U \S
with the minimum ratio c(u)F (S∪u)−F (S) into S, until F (S) ≥ b.
Note that the function C in SSC is monotone. Thus, PEDSSC
cannot be reduced to SSC, if a non-monotone measure is used
instead of PRH .
Algorithm: GDE
Input: Graph G, activation graph G˜v , threshold maxP , PageRank distribution
PR(G), restart probability α
Output: Set of edges E′
1 foreach edge e = (u, u′) of G˜v do
2 PRH(e) ← (1− α) · PR(u)
|n+(u)|
3 E′ ← ∅
4 while P(v,QS,v , E)− P(v,QS,v , E′) > maxP do
5 Reconstruct G˜v and find an edge e of G˜v s.t. gP(e) > 0 and PRH(e)gP (e) is
minimum
6 E′ ← E′ ∪ e
7 Delete E′ from G
8 return E′
Greedy Delete Edges (GDE). GDE is applied to the
activation graph G˜v of v and constructs the subset of edges
E′ to be deleted iteratively. As can be seen in the pseudocode,
the algorithm computes the PRH of each edge in G˜v (steps
1-2) and constructs E′, based on a similar criterion to that
of the algorithm of [21] (steps 4-6). That is, it selects the
edge e with the minimum ratio PRH(e)gP (e) , where gP(e) =
P(v,QS,v, E
′∪e)−P(v,QS,v, E
′) is the path probability gain
of e. The path probability gain gP(e) quantifies the increase in
P(v,QS,v, E
′), caused by the selection of e. Thus, the selected
edge has small PRH and contributes significantly to lowering
the activation probability Pv . To ensure that gP(e) is positive,
we reconstruct G˜v in Step 5. Next, e is added into E′ (step
6), and the process is repeated if the activation probability
P(v,QS,v, E) − P(v,QS,v, E
′) exceeds maxP . Last, E′ is
deleted from G and returned (steps 7-8).
Theorem 4 shows that GDE finds a solution with PRH at
most 1 + ln(λ) times larger than that of the optimal solution,
where λ depends on the PRH and path probability gain of the
selected edges. The proof easily follows from [21] (omitted).
Theorem 4. Let E′ be the output of GDE and E′OPT be
the optimal solution to PEDSSC . It holds that PRH(E′) ≤
(1 + ln(λ)) · PRH(E′OPT ), where λ is the minimum of: (I)
the maximum ratio gP(e1)gP(e) , (II)
PRH(eℓ)
gP (eℓ)
/PRH(e1)gP (e1) , and (III)
P(v,QS,v ,E
′)
gP (eℓ)
, where e1 (resp., eℓ) is the edge that was first
(resp., last) added into E′, and e is an edge in E′ \ e1.
GDE needs O(|Ev | · |E′| · T ) time, where Ev is the edge
set of G˜v , E′ ⊆ Ev is the set of deleted edges, and T is the
maximum time needed to compute gP(e). Specifically, step 4
is executed O(|E′|) times, and step 5 needs O(|Ev | ·T ) time.
In practice, T << |Ev| because the activation probabilities
are computed using small subgraphs of G˜v (see Section II-C).
VI. ALGORITHMS FOR MULTIPLE VULNERABLE NODES
This section presents AGDE and IGDE, which address the
PED problem when there are multiple vulnerable nodes.
Aggregate Greedy Delete Edges (AGDE). AGDE is an
approximation algorithm, which reduces the activation prob-
abilities of multiple vulnerable nodes simultaneously, using a
single (aggregate) constraint function. This function allows us
to model PED as an SSC problem and to base AGDE on the
algorithm of [21]. In the following, we present the aggregate
constraint function.
We aim to check whether the condition (II) of PED is
satisfied, using a single function. This condition is writ-
ten as P(v,QS,v, E) − P(v,QS,v, E′) ≤ maxP , which
implies P(v,QS,v, E′) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP , for
each vulnerable node v. Now, we replace P(v,QS,v, E′)
by min(P(v,QS,v, E′),P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP). Clearly,
this reduces (truncates) P(v,QS,v, E′) to the constant
P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP , if only if P(v,QS,v, E′) ≥
P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP , for a vulnerable node v. Thus,
the condition (II) of PED is satisfied, if and only
if
∑
v∈Dmin(P(v,QS,v, E
′),P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP) =∑
v∈D(P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP). Based on this observation,
we define the aggregate constraint function, called aggregate
path probability, as:
P(D,∪v∈DQS,v , E
′
) =
∑
v∈D
min(P(v, QS,v , E
′
),P(v,QS,v , E)−maxP)
where D ⊆ V is the subset of vulnerable nodes.
We now present a formulation of the PED problem, which
uses the aggregate path probability. For clarity, the problem in
this formulation is referred to as PEDAggr.
Problem 3 (PEDAggr). Let S ⊆ V be the subset of seed nodes,
D ⊆ V be the subset of vulnerable nodes, and G˜D = ∪v∈DG˜v
be the activation graph of D. Given a threshold maxP in
[0, 1] and the PRH of each edge of G˜D , find an edge subset
E′ ⊆ E of G˜D such that: (I) PRH(E′) is minimum, and (II)
P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E
′) =
∑
v∈D (P(v,QS,v, E)−maxP).
PEDAggr can be reduced to SSC, based on a similar reduc-
tion to that of Theorem 3 (omitted), where the submodularity
of the function P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′) easily follows from the
submodularity of P(v,QS,v, E′). Thus, we can obtain an
approximate solution to PEDAggr by using the algorithm of
[21] as the basis of our AGDE algorithm.
In what follows, we present the AGDE algorithm. As
can be seen in the pseudocode, the algorithm is applied
to the activation graph G˜D and iteratively selects the edge
with the minimum ratio PRH(e)gPD (e) (step 5), where gPD(e) =
P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E
′ ∪ e) − P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E
′) is the ag-
gregate path probability gain. The process is repeated until
the condition (II) of PEDAggr holds. Note that this condition
holds, in the worst case when E′ contains all edges of G˜D.
Thus, AGDE will always terminate.
Algorithm: AGDE
Input: Graph G, activation graph G˜D , threshold maxP , set of vulnerable nodes
D, PageRank distribution PR(G), restart probability α
Output: Set of edges E′
1 foreach edge e = (u, u′) of G˜D do
2 PRH(e) ← (1− α) · PR(u,G)
|n+(u)|
3 E′ ← ∅
4 while P(D,∪v∈DQS,v , E′) <
∑
v∈D(P(v,QS,v , E)−maxP) do
5 Reconstruct G˜D and find an edge e of G˜D s.t. gPD (e) > 0 and
PRH(e)
gPD
(e)
is minimum
6 E′ ← E′ ∪ e
7 Delete E′ from G
8 return E′
AGDE finds a solution with PRH at most 1 + ln(λD)
times larger than that of the optimal solution to PEDAggr,
where λD is as in Theorem 4 but with gPD (respec-
tively, P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′)) instead of gP (respectively,
P(v,QS,v, E
′)). The proof follows from [21] and is omitted.
Clearly, AGDE needs O(|E| · |E′| ·TD) time, where E is the
edge set of G˜D , E′ ⊆ E is the set of deleted edges, and TD
is the maximum time needed to compute gPD .
Iterative Greedy Delete Edges (IGDE). As can be seen
in the pseudocode, IGDE sorts the vulnerable nodes, in
decreasing order of activation probability, and applies GDE
to the activation graph G˜v of one vulnerable node v at a time.
This heuristic improves efficiency, because: (I) G˜v contains
a much smaller number of edges than the activation graph
of all vulnerable nodes to which AGDE is applied, and
(II) the edge subset E′v that is deleted in an iteration is
not considered again. However, this reduces the number of
explored solutions. Therefore, vulnerable nodes with large
activation probability P(v,QS,v, E) are dealt with first, when
more edges are available for deletion.
Algorithm: IGDE
Input: Graph G, threshold maxP , set of vulnerable nodes D, activation graph
G˜v for each v ∈ D, PageRank distribution PR(G), restart probability α
Output: Set of edges E′
1 sort each v in D in decreasing order of activation probability P(v,QS,v , E)
2 E′ ← ∅; Gtmp ← G
3 foreach v in D do
4 if P(v,QS,v , E)− P(v,QS,v , E′) > maxP then
5 E′v ← GDE(G, G˜v,maxP, PR(Gtmp), α)
6 foreach v in D do
7 Update G˜v to reflect the deletion of E′v
8 E′ ← E′ ∪E′v
9 return E′
Note that each vulnerable node v is considered once,
because P(v,QS,v, E′) cannot decrease in the next iterations
(see Theorem 2). Thus, after the loop of step 3 terminates,
the condition (II) of PED holds, and the subset of edges
E′ is returned (step 9). Furthermore, GDE is applied to the
PageRank distribution of the original graph (step 5), so that
edge deletion does not affect the PRH computation in GDE.
IGDE needs O(
∑
v∈D(|Ev| · |E
′| · T + |D| · |Ev|)) time.
VII. RELATED WORK
Existing methods limit the diffusion of information by mod-
ifying the graph, or by initiating the diffusion of information
of opposite content.
Methods that modify the graph aim to minimize the spread
(expected number of activated nodes) directly, or indirectly
by optimizing a graph property. To minimize the spread
directly, there are heuristics that apply node [23] or edge
[15] deletion, under the Independent Cascade (IC) model (e.g.,
[23]), or under the Linear Threshold (LT) model (e.g., [15]).
There is also an approximation algorithm [14] under the LT
model, which deletes an edge subset of given size. Methods
for minimizing the spread indirectly were proposed in [18],
[20]. All methods that modify the graph follow the collective
approach, which requires reducing the activation probabilities
of all nodes as much as possible. In addition, they assume that
deleting each edge has the same impact on the information
propagation properties of the graph. Thus, these methods are
not applicable to our problem, as discussed in Introduction.
Methods that minimize the spread of undesirable (negative)
information, by diffusing information of opposite content
(positive information) were proposed in [5], [12], under an
extended IC [5] or LT [12] model. These methods select seeds
which diffuse the positive information and aim to prevent
the diffusion of negative information to the largest (expected)
number of nodes. However, the PED problem requires limiting
the diffusion to vulnerable nodes, while not affecting the infor-
mation propagation to other nodes. Therefore, these methods
cannot be applied to our problem.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate AGDE and IGDE, in terms
of their effectiveness and efficiency. Since existing methods
are not applicable to the PED problem, we compared our
algorithms against baselines that use different edge selection
criteria, and against the optimal method, BRUTEFORCE, which
examines all edge subsets. In addition, we show that PRH is
an effective and efficient proxy of the change to the PageRank
scores, caused by edge deletion.
Setup and datasets. To quantify the impact of edge deletion,
we used: (I) PRH , (II) the L1 distance, (III) the percentage of
deleted edges, and (IV) the Kendall τb correlation (Kτb). Kτb
captures changes to the ranking of all nodes, with respect to
their PageRank scores [3]. A Kτb value of 1 implies no change
to the ranking and larger values are preferred.
We implemented all algorithms in C++ and applied them
to the cit-HepPh (Ph), Wiki-vote (Wiki), and Polblogs (Pol)
datasets. Ph and Wiki are available at http://snap.stanford.edu/
data and Pol at http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼mejn/. We also used
two synthetic datasets, AB and ER, which were generated by
the Albert-Barabasi and the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model, respectively.
These models were also used in [7], [14]. Table I summarizes
the characteristics of each dataset and its default values for
maxP , |S| (# of seeds), and |D| (# of vulnerable nodes).
BRUTEFORCE does not scale to real datasets. Thus, it was
applied to 1000 datasets, which have 16 nodes and 28 edges
on average and were generated by the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model.
Dataset |V | |E| (avg, max) in-deg. maxP |S| |D|
Ph 34546 421578 (24.3, 846) 0.1 200 50
Wiki 7115 103689 (13.7, 452) 0.1 75 20
Pol 1490 19090 (11.9, 305) 0.1 500 20
AB 111150 500000 (9, 99907) 0.01 500 5
ER 5000 49917 (9.98, 24) 0.01 50 20
TABLE I: Characteristics of datasets and default values
All edge probabilities were assigned by the uniform method
(i.e., each incoming edge to u has edge probability 1|n−(u)| )
[7], [13] and the threshold h was set to 10−3, as in [10].
The vulnerable nodes were: (I) selected randomly among the
top-10% of nodes with the largest in-degree, in Ph, Wiki, Pol,
and ER, and (II) the 5 nodes with the largest in-degree, in all
other datasets. This excludes nodes that are easy to deal with.
To find the seeds, we considered each vulnerable node v and
iteratively selected random paths of length at least 2 that end
at v, until Pv ≥ min(r ·maxP , 1), where r ≥ 1 is a random
integer. The start nodes of these paths were used as seeds.
Since there were many other paths from seeds to vulnerable
nodes, the activation graphs were large. All experiments ran
on an Intel Xeon at 2.4Ghz with 12Gb RAM.
Quality of approximation. We demonstrate that AGDE finds
near-optimal solutions, by comparing it to BRUTEFORCE. Fig.
5a shows the ratio between the PRH for AGDE and for
BRUTEFORCE, as well as the approximation ratio 1+ ln(λD),
when maxP = 0.2, for all 1000 datasets (sorted in decreasing
PRH). The ratio is 1 for 70% of the datasets, 1.04 on average,
and at most 1.7. The approximation ratio is 2.6 on average and
at most 6. Thus, AGDE produced solutions that are close to
optimal, and the ratio of AGDE to BRUTEFORCE was much
lower than the approximation ratio.
Effectiveness. We demonstrate that AGDE and IGDE do
not substantially affect the information propagation properties
of the graph and that they delete a small number of edges.
We compared our methods with two baselines: (I) BPRH ,
which selects the edge with the minimum PRH , and (II)
BPGain, which selects the edge with the maximum aggregate
path probability gain. Both baselines are based on AGDE but
do not offer approximation guarantees.
Figs. 5b and 5c show the PRH , for varying maxP . The
PRH decreases as maxP increases, because the required
reduction in activation probabilities becomes smaller. AGDE
was the best method, and the PRH for IGDE was slightly
larger. The baselines performed much worse, because BPRH
deleted edges that did not reduce the activation probabilities of
vulnerable nodes and BPGain deleted edges with large PRH .
Figs. 5d and 5e show the results for the L1 distance, which
follows the same trend as PRH . This suggests that minimizing
PRH helps preserving the PageRank distribution. AGDE and
IGDE performed similarly with respect to Kτb and better than
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the baselines (see Fig. 6a). Furthermore, AGDE and IGDE
deleted at most 0.04% more edges than BPGain, which aims
to minimize the number of deleted edges (see Fig. 6b).
Next, we measured effectiveness, for varying |S|, using
seed sets of increasing size, whose elements were contained
in all larger sets. Figs. 6c and 6d show that the L1 distance
increases with |S|. This is because the activation probabilities
of vulnerable nodes, before edge deletion, are higher for
large seed sets. They also show that AGDE and IGDE
outperformed both baselines. Furthermore, AGDE and IGDE
deleted at most 0.01% more edges than BPGain (see Fig. 6e).
We also measured effectiveness, for varying |D| (# of
vulnerable nodes). AGDE and IGDE performed similarly and
significantly better than both baselines, with respect to the L1
distance (see Fig. 7a). Furthermore, our methods deleted at
most 0.5% more edges than BPGain (see Fig. 7b).
Thus, AGDE and IGDE preserved the information propa-
gation properties of the graph much better than both baselines,
and they deleted a similar number of edges with BPGain,
which aims to minimize the number of deleted edges.
Efficiency. We demonstrate that AGDE and IGDE scale well
with |S|, |D|, and |E|, and that they are more efficient than
the fastest baselines, BPRH and BPGain. In addition, we show
that IGDE is substantially more efficient than AGDE.
Fig. 7c shows that AGDE and IGDE scaled better than
linear (sublinearly) with |S|. However, IGDE was up to 4
times faster, as it considers seeds contained in the activation
graph of one vulnerable node at a time. Fig. 7d shows that
IGDE scaled sublinearly with |D|, and it was up to two
orders of magnitude faster than AGDE. This is because
the edges deleted in an iteration of IGDE affected many
activation graphs. Fig. 7e shows that AGDE and IGDE scaled
sublinearly with |E|, and that IGDE was up to one order of
magnitude faster. The baselines scaled similarly to AGDE,
and the results for the ER dataset were similar (omitted).
Threshold h. We demonstrate the impact of h on the L1
distance and on the runtime of AGDE and IGDE. Figs. 8a and
8b show that the L1 distance decreased by 0.07% on average,
for h ≤ 10−3 and substantially for larger h values. The
runtime of both methods decreased significantly as h increases.
Thus, setting h to 10−3, as suggested in [10], allows estimating
the activation probabilities accurately and efficiently.
Benefit of using PRH vs. the L1 distance. We demonstrate
the effectiveness and efficiency of using PRH as a proxy of
the change to the PageRank scores, caused by edge deletion.
We compared our algorithms against BL1/PGain, a baseline
that implements the greedy approach based on the L1 distance
(see Section III).
Figs. 8c, 8d, and 8e show the results for varying maxP , |S|,
and |D|, respectively, with respect to the L1 distance. The L1
distance for BL1/PGain was 5 times larger than that of AGDE
and IGDE, on average. In addition, BL1/PGain was several
orders of magnitude slower than our algorithms, because it
computes the PageRank distribution of the graph after deleting
each edge, in order to select the best edge in each iteration. For
example, BL1/PGain required 12 hours when applied to Pol
with |D| = 50, while IGDE needed 90 seconds. Thus, PRH
is a more effective and efficient measure to avoid changes to
the PageRank distribution compared to the L1 distance.
Benefit of computing PRH on G. We demonstrate that
computing the PRH of every edge in a subset E′ on the
graph G helps efficiency and does not impact effectiveness.
We compared AGDE with BPRHupd/PGain, a baseline that
computes the PRH of an edge e on a graph G′e, produced
from G by deleting all edges that were added into E′ before
e. The baseline is based on AGDE, because AGDE computes
the PRH of more edge subsets (potential solutions) than
IGDE, and this allows comparing the PRH computation
strategies on more subsets. We repeated all experiments of
the effectiveness subsection above and found that AGDE and
(a) (b) (c)
# vulnerable nodes
R
un
tim
e 
(s)
5 10 100 500
1
⋅
10
2
1
⋅
10
3
1
⋅
10
4
1
⋅
10
5
AGDE
IGDE
BPRH
BPgain
linearIGDE
(d)
# edges
R
un
tim
e 
(s)
10K 25K 100K 250K 500K
0
20
00
40
00
60
00 AGDE
IGDE
BPRH
BPgain
linearIGDE
linearAGDE
(e)
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Fig. 8: (a) L1 distance vs. h, for Wiki. (b) Runtime vs. h, for Wiki. Comparison with BL1/PGain. L1 distance vs. (c) maxP , (d) |S|, and
(e) |D|, for Pol.
BPRHupd/PGain produced the same solutions, except in the
experiments of Figs. 5c and 6d. In the experiments of Figs.
5c and 6d the algorithms broke ties differently. Thus, their
solutions differed in at most 5 edges and had the same PRH .
However, AGDE was up to 84% faster, because it avoids
recomputing the PageRank distribution of the graph. Thus,
our PRH computation strategy is both effective and efficient.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Existing works for limiting the diffusion of information by
edge deletion assume that the diffusing information can affect
all nodes and that deleting each edge has the same impact on
the information propagation properties of the graph. In this
work, we introduced an approach that lifts these restrictive
assumptions. Our approach reduces the activation probabilities
of vulnerable nodes to at most a specified threshold, and
it applies edge deletion while preserving the information
propagation properties of the graph, by avoiding changes to
its PageRank distribution. We proposed a measure to capture
these changes, and based on the measure we formulated the
PED problem. To deal with the problem, we developed an
effective approximation algorithm and an efficient heuristic.
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